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CHILD SEX ABUSE EVIDENCE
PROBLEMS-UPDATE 1988
Robert P. Ringland*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a 1986 University of Dayton Law Review article,1 this author
analyzed various evidentiary issues which commonly arise in trials involving sexually abused children and discussed several guidelines which
have been established by Ohio courts for resolving these issues. Several
of the unreported cases that were discussed in the 1986 article have
since been reported2 and some have been appealed to and decided by
the Ohio Supreme Court.3 Additionally, Ohio courts have considered
several other problems common to child sex abuse cases such as the use
of video taping and closed circuit television at trial, psychological testing of victims, and issues concerning a defendant's right to confrontation.4 This article will examine the effects of the evolution of court
holdings in Ohio on those evidentiary issues examined in the 1986 article and explore the additional evidence problems not previously
discussed.
II.

INDICTMENT

Failure by the prosecution to provide specific dates and times in
the indictment has been a critical issue in child sex abuse cases.' Objections raised by defense counsel with respect to such omissions typi-

* Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Clermont County, Ohio. B.A., Ohio State University
(1967); J.D., University of Cincinnati School of Law (1970). Former Defense Attorney and Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; Member of the Ohio Bar.
1. See Ringland, Child Sex Abuse Evidence Problems, 12 U. DAYTON L. REv. 27 (1986)
(the 1988 update supplements the previously cited article and should be read in conjunction with
that article).
2. See State v. Astley, 36 Ohio App. 3d 247, 523 N.E.2d 322 (1987); State v. Garfield, 34
Ohio App. 3d 300, 518 N.E.2d 568 (1986); State v. Tomlinson, 33 Ohio App. 3d 278, 515 N.E.2d
963 (1986).
3. See State v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d 87, 524 N.E.2d 466 (1988); State v. Johnson, 36
Ohio St. 3d 224, 522 N.E.2d 1082 (1988); State v. Zeh, 31 Ohio St. 3d 99, 508 N.E.2d 1021
(1987).
4. See, e.g., State v. Eastham, 39 Ohio St. 3d 307, 530 N.E.2d 409 (1988) (right to confrontation violated by use of closed circuit television that prevented the victim/witness from seeing
the defendant); State v. Johnson, No. CA85-12-105 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Dec. 31, 1986)
(trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to grant motion for psychiatric examination of
victims/witnesses), rev'd on other grounds, 36 Ohio St. 3d 224, 522 N.E.2d 1082 (1988).
5. See Ringland, supra note 1, at 27.
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cally claim that the defendant's due process rights have been violated6

or that the omissions are in violation of the Ohio Criminal Rules of
Procedure. 7 In State v. Sellards8 the Ohio Supreme Court held that
this type of objection will be sustained only when the failure to provide
specific dates and times in the indictment would "truly prejudice[] the
accused's ability to fairly defend himself." 9 Since the Sellards decision
was rendered in 1985, few cases have discussed this indictment issue at
all and those courts that have generally pass over the issue with little
explanation.1 ° To date, none of the courts which have discussed the indictment issue has determined that the accused's ability to defend himself was prejudiced." Specifically, several recent cases have demon-

strated that Ohio courts do not support the proposition that the
prosecution's failure to provide specific dates and times in the indictment will Prejudice the defendant's ability to present an alibi defense. 2

III.

CLOSURE OF THE COURTROOM

The United States Supreme Court has set forth the standard for
determining whether the press and the general public should be excluded from the courtroom in child sex abuse cases. 3 In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,'4 the Court established several factors
which may be considered by the trial court on a case by case basis.'"
These criteria include "the minor victim's age, psychological maturity
and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim,

6. Id. at 27-28.
7. Id. at 28.
8. 17 Ohio St. 3d 169, 478 N.E.2d 781 (1985).
9. Id. at 172, 478 N.E.2d at 784; see also Ringland, supra note 1, at 30.
10. See State v. Alexander, No. 51565 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. Feb. 19, 1987).
11. See State v. Myers,.No. CA88-01-003 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Aug. 29, 1988); State
v. Barnecut, No. 30-CA-87 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Apr. 4, 1988); State v. Berezoski, No. 9568
(Ohio Ct. App., 2nd Dist. Dec. 17, 1986); State v. Bennett, No. 4033 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist.
Dec. 3, 1986); State v. Albrecht, No. 85AP-949 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist. May 22, 1986); State
v. White, No. 85-CA-38 (Ohio Ct. App., 2nd Dist. Apr. 17, 1986).
12. However, it should be noted that most of these cases involved facts which indicated
repeated access by the defendant to the victim or proximity of location between the victim and
defendant. See, e.g., State v. Myers, No. CA88-01-003, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist.
Aug. 29, 1988) (stepdaughter molested by stepfather during visitation with mother); State v.
Barnecut, No. 30-CA-87, slip op. at 8 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Apr. 4, 1988) (defendant did not
deny being present but denied the occurrences); Alexander, No. 51565, slip op. at 2 (victims were
two daughters and a stepdaughter); State v. Berezoski, No. 9568, slip op. at 1-2 (Ohio Ct. App.,
2nd Dist. Dec. 17, 1986) (victim was resident stepdaughter); State v. Bennett, No. 4033, slip op.
at 6 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Dec. 3, 1986) (defendant did not dispute his presence).
13. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); see also Ringland, supra
note 1, at 31.
14. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
15. Id. at 608.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/10

19881

UPDATE 1988

and the interests of parents and relatives." 16 In State v. Workman,17
the Eighth District Court of Appeals relied on this standard, holding
that the decision regarding closure of the courtroom is within the discretion of the trial court-where the trial court has considered the criteria set forth in Globe. 18
Although Ohio courts have not applied the Globe standard in a
trial involving child sex abuse since Workman, the Ohio Supreme
Court did rely on that standard in State ex rel. Thompson Newspapers, Inc. v. Unger. 9 The Thompson case involved an appeal brought
by a member of the press who had been excluded from a courtroom in
two separate murder trials." In Thompson, closure orders by the trial
courts in both murder cases were held to have been improperly entered. " However, in Thompson the Ohio Supreme Court did not rely
solely on the standard set forth in Globe. Instead, it further refined that
standard by requiring not only a consideration of the interests to be
protected by the closure, but also a consideration of the availability of
reasonable alternatives to closure. Additionally, the Thompson court
analyzed whether the closure restriction was drawn as narrowly as possible. 3 The Twelfth District Court of Appeals has ruled that a trial
court which enters a closure order must hold a hearing where the press
and the public have a "meaningful opportunity" to be heard and that
the court must make specific findings on the record regarding its reasons for closure. 4
Another issue closely related to that of closure is the consideration
of which witnesses may remain in the courtroom despite an opposing
party's request for separation of witnesses. Several courts have addressed this issue since the publication of the 1986 article. In State v.
Collins,25 the Fourth District Court of Appeals held that the chief
caseworker of Children Services could not be excluded from the courtroom since she was "a person whose presence is shown by a party to be

16. Id.,
17. 14 Ohio App. 3d 385, 471 N.E.2d 853 (1984).
18. Id. at 389, 471 N.E.2d at 859-60; see also Ringland, supra note 1, at 31-32.
19. 28 Ohio St. 3d 418, 504 N.E.2d 37 (1986).
20. Id. at 418, 504 N.E.2d at 37.
21. Id. at 422, 504 N.E.2d at 41.
22. Id. at 421, 504 N.E.2d at 41.
23. Id.
24. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Court of Common Pleas, Clermont County, No.
CA88-04-033, slip op. at 8 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. May 2, 1988), remanded in 42 Ohio St. 3d
1982 (1989), dismissed, CA88-04-033 (June 20, 1989).
25. No. 1763 (Ohio Ct. App., 4th Dist. May 28, 1986).
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essential to the presentation of [the party's] cause.""6 Similarly, in
State v. Lipp,27 the Sixth District Court of Appeals allowed a "support
person," who was scheduled as a witness, to be present during the taking of a child victim's deposition, so long as "nothing substantive was
testified to" by that person and "the primary purpose for her appearance was to assure that she in no way coached the child victim during
[the victim's] testimony.'' 8 One court has gone so far as to allow the
aunt of a child victim not only to remain in the courtroom, but also to
permit the child to sit on the aunt's lap during the child's testimony. 9
Furthermore, in State v. Harrison30 the Eighth District Court of Appeals permitted a child's mother to remain in the courtroom during
competency voir dire."1 It is also noteworthy that since the 1986 article
the Ohio Legislature has amended Ohio Revised Code § 2317.01 to
require that judges conduct competency hearings in abuse, neglect or
dependency cases in the presence of only those individuals considered
"necessary" by the court.3 2
IV.

COMPETENCY OF CHILD WITNESSES

Another critical problem is that of the competency of children to
testify at trial. One important issue which arises in this area is who
may question a child during voir dire in order to determine whether the
child is competent. A number of Ohio appellate courts have held that
the trial judge may conduct voir dire without the participation of coun-

26. Id. slip op. at 9 (quoting OHIO R. EVID. 615(3) (Anderson 1981)). In its entirety Rule
615(3) states:
At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear
the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. This rule
does not authorize exclusion of. . .(3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be
essential to the presentation of his cause.
27. No. E-86-74 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. Jan. 29, 1988).
28. Id. slip op. at 41. The Lipp court acknowledged that under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2907.41(A)(2) (Anderson 1981) the child's support person at the video taped deposition is not to
be a witness at trial. Lipp, No. E-86-74, slip op. at 41. However, the court found that under the
facts of the case the defendant was not prejudiced by that presence. Id. slip op. at 41-42.
29. See State v. Johnson, 38 Ohio App. 3d 152, 528 N.E.2d 567 (1986).
30. No. 53758 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. May 12, 1988) (noting that nothing in the record
demonstrated that the mother's presence affected the child's testimony).
31. Id. slip op. at 3.
32. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.01 (Anderson Supp. 1988) provides:
In a hearing-in an abuse, neglect, or dependency case, any examination made by the court
to determine whether a child is a competent witness shall be conducted by the court in an
office or room other than a courtroom or hearing room, shall be conducted in the presence
of only those individuals considered necessary by the court for the conduct of the examination or the well-being of the child, and shall be conducted with a court reporter present.
The court may allow the prosecutor, guardian ad litem, or attorney for any party to submit
questions for use by the court in determining whether the child is a competent witness.
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sel. 33 However, other appellate courts have determined that counsel
may conduct voir dire without the court's participation.' Finally, some
appellate courts have held that the trial court may question the child
and then allow counsel to question the child afterwards.35
Appellate courts have also been called upon to distinguish between
the trial court's function of determining competency and the jury's
function of determining credibility. 6 This is necessary in order to correct attempts by the parties to have a child declared incompetent
merely on the grounds that the child is not telling the truth during voir
dire.37 Since the issue of competency will have already been decided
before the case goes to the jury, no special jury instructions on a young
child's competency are required. 8
Several of the remaining issues concerning child competency may
have to be resolved by the Ohio Supreme Court. One such issue is
whether the trial court must conduct the voir dire of a child under ten
years of age, even where no such request has been made by counsel.
Most appellate courts in Ohio have found that a failure of the trial
judge to conduct voir dire of his own volition does not constitute plain
error.3 9 In State v. Kinney, "° however, the First District Court of Appeals characterized a trial judge's failure to determine the competency
of a mentally retarded ten year old as "so obvious and prejudicial as to
constitute plain error.""
A second issue is whether the child must be determined to be competent at the time of the alleged incident or at the time of trial. Generally, in order to determine competency of a child witness, the trial
court must consider the child's intellectual capacity for observation,
recollection, and communication.' Citing the decision of State v.

33. See, e.g., State v. Workman, 14 Ohio App. 3d 385, 463 N.E.2d 61 (1984).
34. See, e.g., State v. Nicholson, No. C-810933 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. Nov. 24, 1982).
35. See, e.g., State v. York, No. C-830944 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. Oct. 10, 1984).
36. See State v. Johnson, No. CA85-12-105, slip op. at 5 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Dec.
31, 1986), rev'd on' other grounds, 36 Ohio St. 3d 224, 522 N.E.2d 1082 (1988).
37. Id. slip op. at 6.
38. See State v. Berezoski, No. 9568, slip op. at 63 (Ohio Ct. App., 2nd Dist. Dec. 17,
1986).
39. See, e.g., State v. McCoy, No. CA87-02-012, slip op. at 5 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist.
Oct. 12, 1987) (citing Sakian v. Taylor, 18 Ohio App. 3d 62, 480 N.E.2d 822 (1984)); State v.
Morgan, 31 Ohio App. 3d 152, 509 N.E.2d 428 (1986).
40. 35 Ohio St. 3d 84, 519 N.E.2d 1386 (1987).
41. Id. at 87, 519 N.E.2d at 1388. This case followed the rationale enunciated by the
Cuyahoga Court of Appeals in Berea v. Petcher, 119 Ohio App. 165, 188 N.E.2d 605 (1983). See
also State v. Johnson, 38 Ohio App. 3d 152, 154, 528 N.E.2d 567, 569 (1986) (stating in dicta
that "[t]he qualification upon competency of children under ten years of age requires a preliminary examination by the trial judge").
42. by
SeeeCommons,
Ringland, supra
note 1,at 33.
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44
Lewis, 43 the First District Court of Appeals held, in State v. Dowers,

that the child's age at the time of the testimony is controlling for the
purpose of determining competency."' However, the Dowers decision
gives no apparent consideration to the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling in
Huprich v. Paul W. Vargas & Sons, Inc."1 In Huprich, the supreme
court held that the age of the child at the time of the alleged incident
was determinative. 47 Admittedly, Huprich was a civil case involving
personal injury, but the staff notes to Evidence Rule 601(A) indicate
that evidence rulings in civil case law are applicable to criminal evidentiary rulings.4 8 This discrepancy between Dowers and Huprich is significant and it leaves trial judges and attorneys in somewhat of a quandary as to the ,scope of voir dire: Should the court follow the Dowers
approach and conduct the voir dire on the basis of the child's ability for
recollection and observation on events immediately before trial, or
should the court apply the Huprich rationale and conduct voir dire on
the basis of the child's cognitive abilities at the time of the occurrence?
One consequence of following the Huprich rationale is that the
child witness will have repeatedly recited the facts of the case outside
the presence of the jury, and, thus, will have extensively rehearsed his
or her. presentation for the trial. However, the seriousness of this problem may depend upon whether the judge conducts voir dire without the
participation of counsel or permits counsel to supplement the proceedings conducted by the court. If the judge conducts voir dire on his own
and uses leading questions to elicit pertinent information about the
events in question,4 9 the judge's voir dire should be the child's last rehearsal of the incident until trial.
There is the danger, though, that a judge's leading questions could
suggest to the child victim what the authorities want to hear and, thus,
lead the child to reshape his or her testimony accordingly before relat-

43. 4 Ohio App. 3d 275, 448 N.E.2d 487 (1982).
44. No. 860135 (Ohio Ct. App., ist Dist. Dec. 24, 1986).
45. Id.slip op. at 8-9 (citing Lewis, 4 Ohio App. 3d at 278, 448 N.E.2d at 489).
46. 3 Ohio St. 2d 87, 209 N.E.2d 390 (1965).
47. Id. at 89, 209 N.E.2d 392. Although Huprich does not explicitly state this proposition
in the body of the opinion, Huprich has been cited for this proposition. See Philpot v. Williams, 8
Ohio App. 3d 241, 242, 456 N.E.2d 1315, 1316 (1983).
48. See Staff Notes, OHio R. EvID. 601(A) (Anderson 1981). The Staff Notes state:
Rule 601(A) in excepting persons of unsound mind and persons under ten years of age who
appear incapable of receiving or relating facts properly, restates verbatim R.C. § 2317.01.
Ostensibly a provision relating to civil cases, it also applies in criminal cases. R.C. §
2945.41 provides that rules of evidence in civil causes where applicable, govern in all criminal causes.
49. Leading questions are permissible during voir dire to determine competency. See, e.g.,
State v. Norwood, No. 11-065 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. May 1, 1987); State v. Hartman, No. II254 (Ohio Ct. App., 11th Dist. Dec. 19, 1986).
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ing it to the jury. Moreover, assuming the judge's questions are suggestive, an issue arises as to whether due process has been afforded to the
defendant if the court has not permitted defense counsel to participate
in voir dire. In Kentucky v. Stincer,50 the United States Supreme Court
held that the exclusion of a defendant from a competency hearing was
not a violation of the defendant's right to due process or his right of
confrontation where the defendant's attorney was present at the competency hearing." In its reasoning, the Court stressed that the defendant's due process rights were not violated by his exclusion because the
questions involved in the competency hearing did not address the substance of the allegations against him, but rather concerned issues such
as the child's age, where the child attended school, and other related
questions. 2 The Court further noted that although voir dire had been
conducted upon an additional child witness concerning the issues of the
offense, the propriety of that action was not at issue: 53 The Stincer
opinion implies that exclusion of a defendant could be a violation of his
due process rights, if the competency hearing exceeded its normal scope
and bore substantial relation to the accused's: opportunity to defend
himself. Thus, a violation of a defendant's due'process or confrontation
rights might well occur if a defense attorney was unable to alleviate the
child's susceptibility to authorities as a result of a judge's refusal to
allow defense counsel to participate in voir dire.
Another consequence of the Huprich rationale is that it may require a trial within a trial. That is, there may be a trial to determine a
child witness's competency within the criminal trial for sexual abuse.
The Dowers approach, which only requires the court to examine the
child concerning his or her cognitive ability immediately before the
trial, would avoid these potential pitfalls and seems to be the better
reasoning. Further support for this conclusion may be drawn from recent studies which indicate that a child's memory, particularly when
refreshed, is no more faulty than that of an adult.5 4

50. 107 S. Ct. 2658 (interim ed. 1987).
51. Id. at 2659.
52. Id. at 2665 n.1, 2667.
53. Id. at 2667 n.20.
54. Some recent psychological studies disclose that children are more proficient at determining fact from fantasy than was previously believed See Johnson & Foley, Differentiating Fact
From Fantasy: The Reliability of Children's Memory, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 33, 34 (1984); Meyers,
The Testimonial Competence of Children, 25 J. FAM. L. 287 (1987). But see C. COLE & E.
LoFrus, THE MEMORY OF CHILDREN 205 (1987) (children under six are least likely to introduce
inaccurate information in their accounts, while eight and nine year olds are most likely to add
extraneous, often implausible information into their accounts, and adults seemed most susceptible
to errors of influence); H. WAKEFIELD & R. UNDERWAGER, ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD ABUSE
67-120 by
(1988).
Published
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LEADING QUESTIONS

Recent child sex abuse cases in Ohio have continued to hold that
the decision of whether to allow leading questions is a matter solely
within the discretion of the trial judge.55 Although Rule 611 (C) of the
Ohio Rules of Evidence states that "[l]eading questions should not be
used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary
to develop his testimony, 56 the discretionary role of the trial court has
not been altered 57 and appellate courts have not found an abuse of discretion where trial courts have allowed the admission of leading
questions. 8
VI.

ANATOMICALLY CORRECT DOLLS

Another area of concern in child sex abuse cases is the use of anatomically correct dolls. Social workers and medical personnel have
found such dolls to be quite useful in interviewing the child witness and
allowing the child to effectively describe the incident.5 9 Likewise, Ohio
courts have continually approved of the evidentiary use of anatomically
correct dolls in the courtroom6" and for diagnostic treatment as well.6 1
In State v. Wagner,6" the Eighth District Court of Appeals noted that
although a child of three years would be verbally unable relay the nature of an alleged incident of sexual abuse, the use of an anatomically
correct doll would permit him to express himself "outside the boundaries of his limited three year old vocabulary." 3 In some instances, the
use of anatomically correct dolls has been suggested in order to trigger
or enhance a child victim's cognitive memory. 6 "
VII.

HEARSAY PROBLEMS

In Ohio, the two most widely accepted hearsay exceptions to a

55. See State v. Figueroa, No. 51587 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. May 14, 1987); State v.
Norwood, No. 11-065 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. May 1, 1987); State v. Timperio, 38 Ohio App.
3d 156, 528 N.E.2d 594 (1987); State v. Hartman, No. 11-254 (Ohio Ct. App., 11th Dist. Dec.
19, 1986); State v. Johnson, 38 Ohio App. 3d 152, 528 N.E.2d 567 (1986); State v. Cantrall, No.
50307 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. Apr. 17, 1986); State v. Venia, No. WD-85-42 (Ohio Ct. App.,
6th Dist. Mar. 7, 1986).
56. OHIO R. EVID. 611(C) (Anderson 1981).
57. See State v. Butterfield, No. C-840353 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. Mar. 13, 1985); State
v. Madden, 15 Ohio App. 3d 130, 472 N.E.2d 1126 (1984).
58. See cases cited supra note 55.
59. See S. SGROI, HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL INTERVENTION IN CHILD ABUSE 322 (1982).
60. E.g., State v. Ringer, No. 12451 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Dec. 31, 1986).
61. See State v. Boston, No. 13107 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Mar. 2, 1988).
62. 30 Ohio App. 3d 261, 508 N.E.2d 164 (1986).
63. Id. at 264, 508 N.E.2d at 167.
64. See Meyers, supra note 54, at 316 n.30. But cf Moss, "Real" Dolls Too Suggestive,
A.B.A. J.. Dec. 1, 1988, at 24.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/10
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child's out-of-court statements are the medical diagnosis exception
under Rule 803(4) of the Ohio Rules of Evidence65 and the excited
utterance exception under Rule 803(2)."6 Arguably, some courts have
"stretched" the application of the medical diagnosis exception in the
context of child sex abuse trials. For instance, in State v. Wilson17 the
Eighth District Court of Appeals held that letters written to a counselor by a child victim were admissible under the medical diagnosis
exception because they were designed to help the author of the letters.6 8 In Reeder v. Reeder, 9 however, the Twelfth District Court of
Appeals ruled that statements made to a welfare worker who held an
administrative position fell outside the medical diagnosis exception.7
The court reasoned that the administrator's skills were sufficient only to

qualify her as an administrative head rather than a child abuse team
expert.7 1 Thus, the child victim's statements to the administrator fell
outside of the medical diagnosis exception, despite the child's lack of
knowledge regarding the social worker's technical capacity.7 2
A split of opinion has developed on the issue of what subjective
knowledge on the victim's part is necessary to qualify a statement
under the medical diagnosis exception. In Ferrell v. Ferrell,7 the Sixth
District Court of Appeals held that the record must establish the
child's awareness that treatment was being given to assist her, in order
to infer that the child would be truthful in order to obtain this help. 74
Other courts do not require such a foundation before admitting the

65. See Gress v. Gress, No. 13191 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Apr. 27, 1988); State v. Boston, No. 13107 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Mar. 2, 1988); State v. Miller, No. 1632 (Ohio Ct.
App., 9th Dist. Feb. 24, 1988); State v. Evans, No. CA86-09-130 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Apr.
27, 1987); State v. Wilson, No. 52031 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. Apr. 23, 1987); State v. Cottrell,
No. 51576 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. Feb. 19, 1987); State v. Robison, No. 85-CA-12 (Ohio Ct.
App., 4th Dist. Oct. 22, 1986); State v. Reger, No. 12378 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. May 14,
1986); Ferrell v. Ferrell, No. H-84-39 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. Mar. 14, 1986).
66. See State v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d 87, 524 N.E.2d 466 (1987); State v. Boston, No.
13107, slip op. at I (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Mar. 2, 1988); State v. Wagner, 30 Ohio App. 3d
261, 508 N.E.2d 164 (1986); State v. Jenkins, No. 12403 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. July 2, 1986);
State v. Fowler, 27 Ohio App. 3d 149, 500 N.E.2d 390 (1985); State v. Brown, No. L-82-297
(Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. Sept. 16, 1983).
67. No. 52031 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. Apr. 23, 1987).
68. Id. slip op. at 10.
69. No. CA84-10-034 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Feb. 18, 1986).
70. Id. slip op. at 8.
71. Id.
72. Id. Professor Glen Weissenberger has opined that the rationale for this hearsay exceptions is the declarant's subjective belief that he would be helped by the person to whom he is
speaking. G. WEISSENBERGER, OHIO EVIDENCE 50 (1988). If one accepts Weissenberger's rationale for the exception, the Reeder court's objective focus on the skills and position of the social
worker might well be misplaced.
73. No. H-84-39 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. Mar. 14, 1986).
74. Id. slip op. at 6-7.
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statements under the medical diagnosis exception." 5
In some instances, the excited utterance exception has also been
"stretched" by Ohio courts. In State v. Wagner 7 6 the Eighth District
Court of Appeals ruled that a three year old's verbal explanation and
physical demonstration with dolls of an incident of abuse to a police
detective six days after its occurrence constituted an excited utterance.7 The Wagner court viewed the child's use of anatomically correct dolls as merely allowing the child to communicate with adults in
an understandable manner? 8 The court noted that "[t]he limited reflective powers of a three year old, coupled with his inability to understand the enormity or ramifications of the attack upon him, sustain[ed]
the truthfulness of his communications." 9
In State v. Wallace,8" the Ohio Supreme Court further extended
the limits of "spontaneity" under the excited utterance exception. The
Wallace court held that a period of unconsciousness, even a lengthy
period, does not necessarily destroy the effect of a startling event upon
the mind of the declarant 8 1 The court reasoned:
[T]he admission of a declaration as an excited utterance is not precluded
by questioning which: (1) is neither coercive nor leading; (2) facilitates
the declarant's expression of what is already the natural focus of the
declarant's thoughts; and (3) does not destroy the domination of the nervous excitement over the defendant's reflective faculties.82
The Ohio Legislature, by its amendment to Ohio Revised Code, §
2151.35, has also created a "child hearsay exception," which gives a
court considerably greater latitude in allowing the admission of hearsay
statements by children in cases involving abused, neglected, or dependent children.8 3

75. See State v. Boston, No. 13107, slip op. at 16 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Mar. 2, 1988);
State v. Robison, No. 85-CA-12, slip op. at 5 (Ohio Ct. App., 4th Dist. Oct. 22, 1986); State v.
Reger, No. 12378, slip op. at 7 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. May 14, 1986).
76. 30 Ohio App. 3d 261, 508 N.E.2d 164.
77. Id. at 264, 508 N.E.2d at 167.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 37 Ohio St. 3d 87, 524 N.E.2d 466.
81. Id. at 88, 524 N.E.2d at 467.
82. Id. at 93, 524 N.E.2d at 472.
83. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35(F) (Anderson Supp. 1988) provides:
In cases regarding abused, neglected or dependent children, the court may admit any statement of a child that the court determines to be excluded by the hearsay rule if the proponent of the statement informs the adverse party of his intention to offer the statement and
of the particulars of the statement, including the name of the declarant, sufficiently in
advance of the hearing to provide the party with a fair opportunity to prepare to challenge,
respond to, or defend against the statement, and the court determines all of the following:
(1)The statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) The statement is
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/10
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VIII.

CONFRONTATIONAL PROBLEMS

Another issue which Ohio courts have recently addressed is the
admissibility of out-of-court statements that are made by children who
are legally incompetent to testify under Rule 601 of the Ohio Rules of
Evidence." Almost all of the districts which have decided this issue
have ruled on the side of admissibility. 85 These courts have based their
decisions on the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Ohio v.
Roberts.86 The Roberts decision allows an unavailable witness's out-ofcourt statement to be admitted if the proponent has made a good faith
attempt to produce the witness and the hearsay evidence bears an "indicia of reliability which [has] been widely viewed as determinative of
whether a statement may be placed before the jury .... "I'
In State v. Pyotsia,8 8 the Eleventh District Court of Appeals found
a violation of the defendant's right of confrontation where the child
witness made statements in the judge's chambers to a court reporter
outside the presence of the defendant, the statements were subsequently read to the jury at trial, and the witness was-for the first
time-subject to cross examination by defendant's counsel at trial."9
However, the authoritative weight of the holding Pyotsia may be somewhat questionable. In Kentucky v. Stincer,90 the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusion of a defendant from the competency hearing of two child witnesses did not interfere with his right of
confrontation where defense counsel was permitted to cross examine
these witnesses at trial and to repeat any questions asked during the
competency hearing.9 1 Yet, as previously discussed, the trial court's
voir dire in Stincer only touched upon information which was unrelated

offered as evidence of a material fact; (3) The statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; (4) The General purposes of the evidence rules and the interests of justice will
best be served by the admission of the statement into evidence.
84. OHIo R. EVID. 601 (Anderson 1981).
85. See Gress v. Gress, No. 13191 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Apr. 27, 1988); State v.Miller,
No. 1632 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Feb. 24, 1988); State v. Evans, No. CA86-09-130 (Ohio Ct.
App., 12th Dist. Apr. 27, 1987).
86. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
87. Id. at 65. Courts have held that a declarant's hearsay reliability should be determined
on a case by case basis. See, e.g., United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982). In
analyzing the Roberts decision and the cases following it, one commentary has provided a "laundry list" of criteria to determine the reliability or guarantee of trustworthiness to be given to an
out of court statement. Buckley & Eastman, Protecting the Child VictimlWitness, National Research Center for Child Advocacy and Protection, A.B.A., 1986 at 6.
88. No. 11-239 (Ohio Ct. App., 11th Dist. Feb. 20, 1987).
89. Id. slip op. at 8.
90. 107 S. Ct. 2658 (interim ed. 1987).
91. Id. at 2664-65.

Published by eCommons, 1988

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14:1

to the basic elements of the offense.92
In Coy v. Iowa,9a the Supreme Court held that a defendant's right

to confrontation was violated where a screen was placed between the
child victim and the defendant during the child's testimony.9 " Still, the
Court evidently believed that there may be exceptions to the face-to-

face requirement which are "necessary to further an important public
policy." '95 Concurring Justices White and O'Connor agreed with this
determination noting that "those [confrontation] rights are not absolute
but rather may give way in an appropriate case to other competing
interests .
"...96
IX.

VIDEOTAPING AND CLOSED CIRCUIT TESTIMONY

A closely related issue is whether a trial court may permit the use
of videotaped and closed circuit testimony of a child victim. In State v.

Lipp,97 the Eighth District Court of Appeals held that there was no
confrontational problem where bright lights were used in a video deposition to prevent the victim from seeing the defendant. 9a The precedential value of this decision seems to have been diluted, though, by the
Ohio Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Eastham,9 9 and the Ohio
State Legislature's subsequent enactment of Ohio Revised Code, §
2907.41.100 In Eastham, the supreme court held that the defendant's

92. Id. at 2665.
93. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (interim ed. 1988).
94. Id. at 2803. In Coy, the Court indicated that when a trial is conducted before a jury the
sixth amendment's confrontation clause requires that the defendant have the right to physically
face those who testify. Id. at 2800. The Court remanded the matter for a determination of
whether this was harmless error. Id. at 2803. If Coy is liberally construed, it would modify the
holding of Roberts and arguably that of Stincer. However, a strict reading of Coy would make
face-to-face confrontation necessary only where the trial is before a jury.
95. Id. at 2802.
96. Id. at 2804.
97. No. E-86-74 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. Jan. 29, 1988).
98. Id. slip op. at 7-8.
99. 39 Ohio St. 3d 307, 530 N.E.2d 409 (1988).
100. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (Anderson Supp. 1988) provides:
[In a child abuse prosecution where the alleged victim is) a child who was under eleven
years of age when the complaint, indictment, or information was filed, whichever occurred
earlier, the judge of the court in which the prosecution is being conducted, upon motion of
an attorney for the prosecution, shall order that the testimony of the child victim be taken
by deposition. If the deposition is taken then the judge shall exclude from the room in
which the deposition is to be taken, every person except the child victim giving the testimony, the judge, one or more interpreters if needed, the attorney for prosecution and the
defense, any person needed to operate the equipment to be used and one person chosen by
the child victim giving the deposition and any other person the judge determines would
"contribute to the welfare and well being of the child victim giving the deposition." The
person chosen by the child victim shall not himself be a witness in the proceeding. The
defendant shall be permitted to observe and hear the testimony of the child victim giving
the deposition on monitor and shall be provided with electronic means of immediate coinhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/10
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right to confrontation was violated where the victim-witness could not
see the defendant on a closed circuit television.'' Section 2907.41 of
the Ohio Revised Code now permits videotaped and closed circuit testimony only where both defendant and victim are allowed to view each
other over a television screen.' 2
X.

EXCEPTION TO EVIDENCE RULE

803(4)

In the past, certain courts admitted hearsay statements describing
a particular occurrence in a sex abuse case under the medical diagnosis
exception.' 0 3 Yet, such courts generally refused to permit statements as
to the defendant's identity.' 04 The reasoning behind such holdings was
that the identity of a defendant would qualify as a statement of fault
which is inadmissible as hearsay.' 0 6 While most Ohio 'appellate decisions find that this evidence should not be admissible, many courts have
refused to find reversible error where such evidence has been admit-

ted.106 For example, in State v. Boston'0 7 the Ninth District Court of
munication with his attorney during the testimony which shall be restricted to a location
that is such that he cannot be seen or heard by the child victim giving the deposition. The
child victim giving the deposition shall be provided with a monitor, on which he can observe during his testimony, the defendant. The defendant and his attorney must receive
notice of the taking of this deposition and shall have the right to be present during its
taking subject to the above. Full cross examination is permitted as in any trial. If the
deposition is taken the child need not be required to testify in person at the trial. The
attorney for the defense may file a motion requesting another deposition based upon newly
acquired discovered evidence which the defense could not have reasonably discovered with
due diligence. If a second deposition is taken it shall be taken by the same means and mode
prescribed under 2907.41 A (2) as stated above.
The live testimony of the child may be taken outside the presence of the defendant by
closed-circuit T.V. in the same means and manner as set forth above during the-taking of a
deposition. The request of the prosecuting attorney to follow this procedure is mandatory
upon the court. The testimony of the child shall be admissible as an exception under the
hearsay rule under 801, 803, or 804 if the defendant had an opportunity and similar motive
at the time of the taking of the deposition to develop the testimony by direct, cross or redirect and the court determines that there is reasonable cause to believe the victim, if he
were to testify in person, would experience serious emotional trauma. The close circuit trial
T.V.requires the court to determine whether the child victim is unavailable to testify in the
room in the presence of the defendant due to persistent refusal of the child victim to testify
despite judicial request to do so, the inability of the child victim to communicate about the
alleged violation because of extreme fear, failure of memory or other similar reason, or that
the child victim will suffer serious emotional trauma from so testifying. The judge may also
record the testimony at the time of trial by videotape using the same methods as set forth
above and play it back, if he finds the child victim is unable to testify because of refusal,
extreme fear, etc., or serious emotional trauma P- set forth above.
101. Eastharn, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 310, 530 N.E.2d at 411.
102. OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Iron Shell, 630 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
104. Id. at 85.
105. Advisory Committee Note, FED. R. EvID. 803(4).
106. See, e.g., State v. Miller, No. 1632 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Feb. 24, 1988) (holding
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Appeals expressly allowed the admission of such testimony, revealing
the identity of the perpetrator." 8
XI.

EXPERT WITNESS OPINIONS

Ohio courts have also continued to delineate the parameters of admissible expert witness opinion on child abuse issues. Generally, physicians are permitted to testify as to the cause of injuries to a child victim based upon their experience, training, and examination of the
child.' 0 9 Physicians have also been permitted to testify as to hypothetical questions on the child abuse syndrome" 0 and whether the symptoms expressed by the victim are consistent with that syndrome."'
In some instances, social workers have been allowed to testify on
issues involving the credibility of the child victim."' However, in
Reeder v. Reeder"8 the Twelfth District Court of Appeals held that a
social worker's opinion as to whether a child was sexually abused fell

that identification testimony was cumulative and therefore harmless); State v. Evans, No. CA8609-130 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Apr. 27, 1987) (allowing admission of evidence because of
attorney's failure to object); State v. Reger, No. 12378 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. May 14, 1986)
(holding that identity testimony was cumulative and, thus, not prejudicial).
107. No. 13107 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Mar. 2, 1988).
108. Id slip op. at 12-16. The Fourth District Court of Appeals also allows such admissions. See State v. Robison, No. 85-CA-12, slip op. at 8 (Ohio Ct. App., 4th Dist. Oct. 22, 1986)
(holding that in child sex abuse cases the identity of the perpetrator "is integral to medical diagnosis and treatment").
109. See State v. Canada, No. C-840189 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. Apr. 17, 1985).
110. See State v. Humfleet, No. CA84-04-031 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Sept. 9, 1985).
111. See State v. Garfield, 34 Ohio App. 3d 300, 518 N.E.2d 568 (1986); State v. Reger,
No. 12378 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. May 14, 1986). However, commentators are critically examining the ability of experts and the "indicators" of child sex abuse. See, e.g., H. WAKEFIELD & R.
UNDERWAGER, supra note 54, at 188-90, 213-16; Comment, The Unreliabilityof Expert Testimony and the Typical Characteristicsof Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 GEO. L.J. 429 (1985). The
terminology used to describe child abuse varies according to the etiology of the exact type of
abuse. Physical abuse is described as the "battered child syndrome." Sexual abuse is labeled the
"sexually abused child syndrome." The term "maltreatment syndrome" has been coined to
broaden the clinical category to include both sexual and physical abuse. Recently, the term "child
abuse syndrome" has slipped into the vocabulary of those associated with this area of the law.
Regardless of the terminology, though, abused children do have certain elements of behavior
which are common, whether they are sexually, physically, or mentally abused. According to commentators, children who are abused tend to display maladaptive behavior that includes the following: (1) submissiveness; (2) abnormal behavior at school-whether it is introversion or extroversion; (3) paranoia; (4) sleeping disorders such as bedwetting or nightmares; (5) depression and
suicidal tendencies; and (6) changes in mood or appetite. See generally S. DAVIS, CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS AND THE LAW (1987); C. KEMPE & R. HELFER, HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND His
FAMILY (1972); AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE (1987); NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND
PROTECTION, INTRAFAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES (1982).
112. See State v. Buhrts, No. CA-3147 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Feb. 23, 1987); Garfield,
34 Ohio App. 3d at 300, 518 N.E.2d at 568.
113. No. CA84-10-034 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Feb. 18, 1986).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/10
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outside the parameter of expert witness testimony under Rule 702 of
the Ohio Rules of Evidence. " " Moreover, in State v. Cottrell1 5 the
Eighth District Court of Appeals characterized the admission of a social worker's testimony on the credibility of the child victim as error-albeit harmless error. " 6 Additionally, the Fourth District Court
of Appeals, in State v. Collins,1 1 7 upheld the trial court's discretion in
refusing to allow a defense psychologist to testify as to the reliability of
the child victim's allegations. " 8

XII.

PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING OF THE VICTIM

Defense attorneys in child sex abuse cases often request that the
victim undergo some form of psychological testing. The Ohio Revised
Code contains no provision authorizing a court to require a witness to
undergo such testing and the courts have held accordingly." 9
There are situations, though, where a child victim may be required
to undergo psychological evaluation. For example, there are certain
cases where the mental state of the child is an essential element of the
crime and the prosecution needs to introduce evidence of the child's
mental condition. 2 ° In such cases, the state may be barred from utilization of such evidence when it is obtained through a clinical interview
with the child victim unless the victim "voluntarily agrees to a courtappointed independent examination with the results being made available to both sides.''

114. Id. slip op. at 7-9. However, it should be noted that the Reeder court also stated that
its "decision ... should not be construed as setting any hard and fast guidelines for determining
when a social worker is qualified to testify as an expert in the area of child abuse." Id. slip op. at
8.
115. No. 51576 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. Feb. 19, 1987).
116. Id. slip op. at 5; see also State v. Holland, No. 33311 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Oct.
19, 1987).
117. No. 1763 (Ohio Ct. App., 4th Dist. May 28, 1986).
118. Id. slip op. at 3.
119. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, No. CA85-12-105 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Dec. 31,
1986) (holding that a denial of a psychiatric exam to prove defendant's theory of programming
was not an abuse of discretion), rev'd on other grounds, 36 Ohio St. 3d 224, 522 N.E.2d 1082
(1988); State v. Duff, No. CA84,02-013 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Dec. 31, 1984) (indicating
that such information would be a violation of the rape shield statute); State v. Kingsley, No.
CA83-07-046 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. June 29, 1984) (holding that the ordering of a psychiatric examination of a witness is discretionary and seems to be prohibited by "tenor" of rape shield
statute); State v. Moyer, No. 43748 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. Mar. 4, 1982) (holding that no
reversible error has been committed when a trial court refuses to order psychiatric examination of
witness, since no such examination is authorized or required by statute).
120. See State v. Zeh, 31 Ohio St. 3d 99, 102, 509 N.E.2d 414, 417 (1987) (sexual battery
case where defendant knew victim's ability to control his own conduct was substantially impaired).
121. Id. at 104, 509 N.E.2d at 419.
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PROBLEMS CONCERNING ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE

Certain evidentiary issues concerning elements of an offense are
frequently raised in child sex abuse cases. When charging the defendant with rape, the prosecution may attempt to enhance the penalty
through allegations that the offender purposely compelled the victim to
submit by force or threat of force. 22 The ability to prove such allegations means the difference between a sentence of four to twenty-five
years (without force) and life imprisonment (with force). 2
In State v. Eskridge,'2 4 the Ohio Supreme Court held that threat
of force could be proved by the surrounding circumstances. 2 5 In reversing the lower court's decision, the supreme court noted that "[t]he
force and violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending upon the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation
to each other; as the relation between father and daughter under twelve
years of age."' 2 6 Ultimately, the supreme court concluded that "[a]s
long as it can be shown that the rape victim's will was overcome by
'27
fear or duress, the forcible element of rape can be established.'
At least one Ohio appellate court had arrived at this conclusion
even before the supreme court's decision in Eskridge. In State v.
Glover,'" the Twelfth District Court of Appeals held that the child
victim's fear of a perpetrator's past violent outbursts was sufficient to
constitute a threat of force.' 9
In sex abuse cases involving children under thirteen years of age,
Ohio appellate courts have held that oral genital "kissing" not constituting actual penetration can establish fellatio. 3 0 However, in order to
prove fellatio where the mouth does not encompass the male organ, the
prosecution must at least show that the "touching of the described areas" was such that a "reasonable person would perceive [it] as sexually
stimulating or gratifying.' 3' If the ejaculum penetrates the mouth, no
showing of penetration by the penis is necessary.' 32 In In Re Smith,'3 3

122. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(3) (Anderson 1981).
123. Id. §§ 2907.02(A)(3), 2929.11(B)(1).
124. 38 Ohio St. 3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304 (1988).
125. Id. at 59, 526 N.E.2d at 306.
126. Id. at 58, 526 N.E.2d at 306.
127. Id. at 59, 526 N.E.2d at 306.
128. No. 85-5-12-106 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Dec. 31, 1986).
129. Id. slip op. at 8.
130. State v. Barnes, No. CA84-05-041, slip op. at 6-7 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Apr. 8,
1985).
131. State v. Astley, 36 Ohio App. 3d 247, 523 N.E.2d 322 (1987).
132. See State v. Coleman, No. C-860511 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. June 24, 1987) (discussing the notion that historically fellatio was considered to be sodomy and, therefore, required
some indication of penetration).
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the Ohio Supreme Court stated that in cases where children commit
fellatio upon each other "[m]ere penetration of the oral cavity is not
sufficient to complete the offense . . .". According to the court, fellatio requires an additional element of sexual satisfaction or
stimulation. 35
One of the elements in most sexual offense cases is that the victim
cannot be the defendant's spouse at the time the offense is committed."3 6 In State v. Bock, 37 the Ohio Supreme Court held that where a
victim's marital status was not addressed during the trial, the jury was
allowed to conclude that the victim was not the defendant's spouse
where the victim was a 12-year-old boy and the defendant was an adult
male. 13 8 However, in State v. Rudd 3 9 the Twelfth District Court of
Appeals held that a trial court's instructions to the jury stating that
there was no question that the victim was not the spouse of the defend40
ant constituted reversible error.1
Gross sexual imposition may be the lesser offense of rape"' and
can be committed by touching the outer clothing of a child or forcing a
child to masturbate." 2 Sexual gratification or arousal need not be
proven under a charge of gross sexual imposition, since the degree of
culpability is strict liability." 3
XIV.

CONCLUSION

While Ohio courts have addressed several of the evidentiary issues
which commonly occur during child sex abuse trials, many important
issues are still unresolved. Since a diversity of Ohio appellate opinions
has arisen in this area of the law, these issues may ultimately have to
be resolved by the Ohio Supreme Court. The issues requiring the
court's most immediate attention are those concerning: (1) the founda-

133. 38 Ohio St. 3d 149, 527 N.E.2d 286 (1988). The Smith opinion is unclear as to
whether penetration is always required for the fellatio rape. The case involved a juvenile who
convinced two other juveniles to fellatiate each other. Id. at 152, 527 N.E.2d at 289. It appears
that the court, in an effort to show that no crime or delinquent act was committed, may have
further confused the issue of penetration.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1) (Anderson 1981).
137. 28 Ohio St. 3d 108, 502 N.E.2d 1016 (1986).
138. Id. at 111, 502 N.E.2d at.1020.
139. No. CA86-05-036 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Mar. 2, 1987).
140. Id. slip op. at 6.
141. State v. Johnson, No. CA85-12-105, slip op. at I I (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Dec. 31,
1986), rev'd on other grounds, 36 Ohio St. 3d 224, 522 N.E.2d 1082 (1988).
142. See State v. Arnold, No. 51254 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. Nov. 20, 1986); State v.
Litton, No. 2087 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Dec. 11, 1985).
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tion for the medical diagnosis hearsay exception; (2) the scope of the
voir dire hearing on the child's competency; (3) the extent to which an
expert can testify as to his or her opinion of a child victim's credibility;
(4) when and if a social worker may testify as a qualified expert and
the allowable scope of such a worker's testimony; and (5) whether the
identity exception to the hearsay rule should be accepted or abolished.
Ohio Supreme Court decisions, as well as further appellate court rulings on these issues, will provide clearer guidelines for trial courts and,
thus, enhance both the defendant's ability to obtain a fair trial and the
judge's ability to make the trial a less arduous experience for the already traumatized child witness.
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